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TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFI' TRUSTS-DEVIATION FROM TRUST TERMS ON THE
BASIS OF UNFORESEEN EMOTIONAL EMERGENCIES-Plaintiff and her son were
the principal beneficiaries of a testamentary spendthrift trust which had
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been created by plaintiff's husband. The son, Montgomery Ward Thorne,
was found dead under unusual circumstances. His will left a portion of
his interest in the trust to his fiancee and her mother. A contest over the
son's will developed between plaintiff and the designated beneficiaries in
the will which caused intense bitterness between the parties. A compromise
agreement was entered into, and plaintiff brought suit to obtain (1) court
approval of the will contest settlement -and (2) a direction to defendant
trustee to invade the corpus of the spendthrift trust to provide funds for
the settlement. The chancellor approved the settlement and directed defendant trustee to invade the corpus. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
chancellor had authority to deviate from the trust terms on the basis of an
emotional emergency engendered by the son's death and the subsequent
dispute between plaintiff and her son's beneficiaries. The existence of
spendthrift provisions did not prevent deviation. Thorne v. Continental
Ill. Nat. Bank b Trust Co., (Ill. App. 1958) 151 N.E. (2d) 398.
The general rule is that spendthrift trusts cannot be terminated even
though all the beneficiaries consent,1 and that the terms of the trust must
be followed. 2 The reason for the rule is that the purpose of such a trust is
to insure its beneficial enjoyment, which can best be accomplished by
securing it from the beneficiaries' own improvidence3 as well as by shielding
it from the claims of creditors.4 Courts have recognized exceptions to this
rule where exigencies develop which were unforeseen by the settlor, and
deviation from the terms of a spendthrift trust is allowed on the basis of
what the settlor would have intended had he anticipated the circumstances.5
Generally, cases applying this exception have involved either economic
emergencies which threaten substantial or complete deterioration of the
trust corpus, 6 or impossibility to comply literally with the trust provisions.7

Harrison's Estate, 322 Pa. 532, 185 A. 766 (1936). See 123 A.L.R. 1438 (1939).
Johns v. Johns, 172 Ill. 472, 50 N.E. 337 (1898).
See Wagner v. Wagner, 244 Ill. 101, 91 N.E. 66 (1910).
4 See Perabo v. Gallagher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922).
5 See Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201 at 230 (1862). See also ScoTT, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §337
(1956), for a discussion of termination and modification of trusts; Scott, "Deviations from
the Terms of a Trust," 44 HARV. L. \REV. 1025 (1931).
6 In re Minden's Will, 138 N.Y.S. (2d) 340 (1954), where the court allowed the sale
of the real property held in trust because of a substantial reduction in net income and
changed character of the community. See also Matter of Pressprich, 124 Misc. 15, 207
N.Y.S. 412 (1924), where the court allowed a sale of the securities constituting the trust
when they became highly speculative.
7 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ghio, 240 Mo. App. 1033, 222 S.W. (2d) 556 (1949). The
court allowed a different investment from the one specified in the trust as none could
be found to yield the required rate. See also Donnelly v. Nat. Bank of Wash., 27 Wash.
(2d) 622, 179 P. (2d) 333 (1947), where the court allowed the beneficiary to use the proceeds
of the trust for the purpose specified despite failure literally to comply because World
War II made literal compliance impossible. However, as stated in Rogers v. English, 130
Conn. 332, 33 A. (2d) 540 (1943), mere "difficulty" to comply will not be a basis for
deviation from the trust terms.
1
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The court in the principal case based its decision on the "emotional"
emergency confronting the plaintiff, believing that such an emergency
could be far more devastating than a financial emergency. The court
reasoned that the dominant purpose of the settlor was the welfare of the
plaintiff and her son, and this would be best effectuated by allowing a part
of the corpus to be used to settle the compromise. Use of the unforeseen
emergency doctrine as a basis for deviation has been substantially extended
by the court in two distinct ways: (l) it is interpreted to include the
beneficiary's "emotional," as opposed to financial emergencies; (2) it is
applied to an emergency which in no way affects the trust corpus. The
principal case appears to hold that if a trust beneficiary becomes involved
in a sufficiently unpleasant situation which money can cure, the chancellor
may in his discretion order the trustee to invade the corpus if he finds the
beneficiary's interest is best served thereby. Adoption of such a position
appears to run at cross currents with a basic purpose of a spendthrift trust,
which is to provide an income from a relatively stable fund which cannot
be tampered with except where emergencies threaten the fund itself. It
is questionable, therefore, whether the action of the court conforms with
the settlor's intent, since "emotional emergencies" might be just the sort
of improvidence from which the settlor attempted to protect his beneficiary.
Another basis for terminating or deviating from the terms of a spendthrift trust which is recognized in many courts is a will compromise agreement.8 The court in the instant case, by way of an additional justification
for its decision, stated that there is "some analogy" between this case and
those involving such agreements.9 In the will compromise cases, however,
including those relied on by the court in the principal case, the controversy
was over the will which established the trust10 while in the instant case the
controversy involved the subsequent will of a trust beneficiary. The significance of this difference is brought out by the view of the New York courts,
which deny that a testamentary trust is being altered or terminated by a
will compromise since the trust does not attain legal existence until final

8 Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fitzpatrick, 256 Mass. 125, 152 N.E. 328 (1926),
which allowed a will compromise to terminate a spendthrift trust; Madden v. Shallenberger, 121 Ohio St. 401, 169 N.E. 450 (1929), which allowed a will compromise to deviate
from the trust terms. See also, l\fass Laws Ann. (1955) c. 204, §§13-17; R.I. Gen. Laws
(1956) tit. 33, c. 7, §17, which deal with allowing will compromise agreements. Contra:
Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat. Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931), where the court
did not allow a will compromise to terminate a spendthrift trust; Stein v. LaSalle Nat.
Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3, 65 N.E. (2d) 216 (1946), where the court did not allow a will
compromise to deviate from the trust provisions. See also note, 31 MICH. L. REv. 268
(1932) for a discussion of the Rose v. Southern Mich. Nat. Bank case.
9 Principal case at 404.
10 E.g., Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fitzpatrick, note 8 supra; N.Y. Life Ins. and
Trust Co. v. Conkling, 159 App. Div. 337, 144 N.Y.S. 638 (1913); Altemeier v. Harris, 403
Ill. 345, 86 N.E. (2d) 229 (1949); Tree v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 346
Ill. App. 509, 105 N.E. (2d) 324 (1952). Both of the Illinois cases were cited by the court
in the principal case.
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adjudication of the will.11 It is often difficult to determine whether this
theory is accepted by other jurisdictions since it is usually not considered,12
but those that do so would be unlikely to grant relief in the principal
case since the New York decisions clearly indicate that the court cannot
affect a previously created trust on the theory of a will compromise. The
use of the will compromise as a basis for the result in the principal case
would appear to be a clear extension of the theory. Thus whether this
decision is based on the doctrine of unforeseen emergency or will compromise, or a combination of both, it appears to represent a substantial departure from traditional views. Nonetheless, the case illustrates the apparent wisdom of leaving the doctrine sufficiently flexible to permit relief in
the highly unusual circumstances which gave rise to this litigation.

Robert ]. Paley

11 See Matter of O'Keefe, 167 Misc. 148, 3 N .Y.S. (2d) 739 (1938), involving a will
contest settlement where the court held that statutory restraints against alienation of a
trust did not apply until after the will creating the trust is probated.
12 See Madden v. Shallenberger, note 8 supra, where a will compromise allowed
modification of a spendthrift trust; Nat. Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Fitzpatrick, note 8
supra, where a will compromise allowed termination of a spendthrift trust. In neither
case was the New York theory discussed. See also Bohannon v. Trotman, 214 N.C. 706,
200 S.E. 852 (1939). Several years after a will establishing a trust had been probated, a
will compromise was allowed and the trustee used part of the trust corpus to effectuate
the settlement. This would seem inconsistent with the New York view expounded in
Matter of O'Keefe, note 11 supra, as it would be difficult to deny the existence of a trust
which had been operating since probate of the original will, and this case might have
gone the opposite way in the New York court. For the Illinois view, see Wolf v. Uhlemann,
325 Ill. 165, 156 N.E. 334 (1927), where the court allowed a will contest settlement to
alter the terms of a testamentary trust without mention of the New York theory. But
see Altemeier v. Harris, note IO supra, which said by way of dictum that a testamentary
spendthrift trust could not be terminated by a will compromise. In the principal case,
the court said they were not terminating the spendthrift trust. But it is at least arguable
that there was termination as to a portion of the spendthrift trust, for which the court
cited no authority under the will compromise theory.

